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Psychological science is increasingly influencing public 
policy. Although it has long played a role in areas such 
as criminal law, social work, and education, the wide-
spread use of behavioral public policy (BPP) constitutes 
a milestone. Behavioral insights concerning concepts 
such as cognitive biases and nonrational decision-making 
are now applied in a general way across most domains 
of government. Well-being is emerging as a second 
domain of psychological science that some people 
would like to see applied in a similarly general way. 
However, advocacy for well-being public policy (WPP) 
has met with opposition in research and political com-
munities. It has been criticized especially for its tech-
nocratic attitude and paternalistic proclivities (Davies, 
2015; Singh & Alexandrova, 2020). These criticisms are 
reminiscent of those directed at BPP over the past 
decade. This déjà vu suggests the need for interdisci-
plinary work that establishes normative principles for 
applying psychological science in public policy. These 
would guide psychologists toward more welcome pol-
icy applications of their knowledge and facilitate a 
smoother translation of psychological science from 
research communities to government.
In this article, we try to distill such principles for 
WPP from the normative debates over BPP. We argue 
that the uptake of BPP by governments was a function 
of its relatively strong normative and epistemic founda-
tions. The ethical paradigm provided by libertarian 
paternalism and the causal understanding of behavioral 
interventions provided by experimental studies made 
early behavioral interventions robust to many critiques. 
Nonetheless, substantial critiques remain and have 
recently led to the development of an alternative nor-
mative framework for considering the legitimacy of 
psychological policies, called boosts (Hertwig & Grüne-
Yanoff, 2017). The boost paradigm rejects paternalism 
and the deficit model of citizen psychology by which 
it is justified. It instead suggests consciously training 
citizens in psychological insights to enhance their 
capacities. We argue that WPPs, especially those with 
the objective of directly improving mental states, cannot 
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Abstract
Psychological science is increasingly influencing public policy. Behavioral public policy (BPP) was a milestone in 
this regard because it influenced many areas of policy in a general way. Well-being public policy (WPP) is emerging 
as a second domain of psychological science with general applicability. However, advocacy for WPP is criticized on 
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be justified under libertarian paternalism. Thus, some 
ethical heavy lifting is required on the part of WPP 
advocates if they want to see insights into well-being 
from psychological science applied in public policy. 
Fortunately, we argue that the boosts paradigm offers 
a strict but feasible framework for substantiating the 
legitimacy not only of BPPs but also of WPPs (and the 
application of psychological science in public policy 
more broadly). We illuminate how some WPPs could be 
fruitfully promoted as boosts and how they might fall 
short of the associated criteria. We found that the spe-
cific policy contexts in which boosts are designed and 
the populations at which they are targeted are crucial 
for navigating their normative justification.
Behavioral Interventions
Behavioral interventions involve the application of 
insights from behavioral psychology (Kahneman, 2011), 
notably those concerning cognitive biases, in policy-
making (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Behavioral scientists 
have argued that traditional rational-choice theories of 
economic behavior assume a model of human rational-
ity and utility maximization that is not reflected in 
empirical reality. As Thaler and Sunstein (2003) put it, 
“in many domains, people lack clear, stable or well-
ordered preferences. What they choose is strongly influ-
enced by details of the context in which they make 
their choice” (p. 1161). Most early applications con-
cerned economic behavior, such as making savings 
plans opt out rather than opt in and changing the layout 
of cafeterias to encourage healthier food choices. Behav-
ioral insights have since been used in a much wider 
range of applications. In particular, the EAST framework 
(easy, attractive, social, and timely) developed by the 
UK’s Behavioural Insights Team is now commonly used 
as a design principle when thinking about policy imple-
mentation (Halpern, 2015). Behavioral interventions 
involve nudges—small changes to the choice architec-
ture confronting a decision-maker that work to remove 
cognitive biases. This aligns people’s fast-thinking deci-
sions with their slow-thinking preferences.
Nudges can be regarded as problematic because, 
among other things, they involve government paternal-
istically manipulating citizens into making certain deci-
sions. In anticipation of these concerns, Thaler and 
Sunstein (2008) grounded their advocacy of behavioral 
policy in a broader political philosophy—libertarian 
paternalism—that tries to reconcile individual freedom 
of choice and paternalistic means of enhancing public 
welfare. Libertarian paternalism has seemingly been 
quite effective at warding off critique given that policy 
institutions have undertaken to promote the use of 
behavioral science research globally (Lourenço et al., 
2016; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development [OECD], 2017, 2019; Van Bavel et  al., 
2013; World Bank, 2015). We argue that if WPP is to 
duplicate the policy success of BPP, it will need to be 
similarly grounded in a sophisticated normative frame-
work. We discuss the key principles and critiques of 
libertarian paternalism below. We then consider whether 
WPP could be justified using libertarian paternalism.
The Normative Foundations  
of Behavioral Interventions
According to Sunstein (2014), paternalism in BPP is justi-
fied because of the clear empirical evidence of “behav-
ioral market failures” to which nudges “are usually the 
best response, at least when there is no harm to others” 
(p. 17). Behavioral market failures can be understood as 
cognitive biases that prevent individuals from making 
efficient, “rational” economic decisions. They are some-
times called consumer failures. Sunstein’s bold assertion 
is based on normative principles of effectiveness, auton-
omy, transparency, and welfare laid out in libertarian 
paternalism. We analyze these principles below.
Effectiveness
The claim that nudges are “usually the best response” 
rests on two of BPP’s key political rationales—nudges 
“work” and are relatively low cost. They work in the 
sense that their significant causal impact on behavior is 
supposedly well established by high-quality experi-
ments, such as randomized controlled trials (RCTs). This 
evidence exists both for the psychological theories 
underpinning behavioral interventions and for the inter-
ventions themselves. They are low cost because they 
typically involve merely tinkering with existing policy 
settings or cosmetic designs, such as using more info-
graphics in communications with citizens, rather than 
creating whole new policies. As Halpern (2015) pointed 
out, “Designing policy, and the nuts and bolts of public 
service, around behavioural insights and empirical meth-
ods led to better outcomes, easier services for the public 
to use, and saved money” (p. 9). We group these appeals 
to efficiency and “what works” under the heading of 
effectiveness as a justification for behavioral policies.
Autonomy
BPP is attractive to policymakers in part because of its 
commitment to promote choice and preserve autonomy. 
Paternalism as a political critique rests on the harm 
principle: that it is illegitimate for governments to pre-
vent agents from behaving as they wish unless that 
behavior causes harm to another person (Conly, 2012). 
Behavioral interventions skirt this critique by preserving 
all choices but adjusting the choice architecture to 
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guide citizens toward “better” choices. Critically, the 
definition of better is not provided by the state but by 
the citizen (see Welfare section below). The choice 
architecture is adjusted to guide a citizen to that citi-
zen’s own preferred outcome. Behavioral economists 
have asserted that preference satisfaction is dogged by 
problems of self-control (Thaler, 2015, p. 86). For 
instance, one may want to give up smoking but then 
choose to smoke where cigarettes are easily available 
and visible. Behavioral interventions such as physically 
obscuring tobacco product packaging in shops preserve 
the option to smoke while removing cognitive cues to 
do so. No choices are prohibited, and no coercion is 
involved. Libertarian paternalism thus supports auton-
omy even as it engages in manipulation.
Transparency
Preempting objections to subliminal state manipulation 
of citizens, Thaler and Sunstein (2008, p. 244) also 
identified transparency as one of the guiding principles 
of libertarian paternalism. Governments adopting poli-
cies on the basis of behavioral insights should be will-
ing to defend them publicly. Thaler and Sunstein 
maintained that nudges are acceptable only when the 
nudger is open about the intention and mechanism of 
the nudge. This does not mean that it is necessary to 
explicitly explain, for instance, that social norms on 
household energy usage are being framed to encourage 
proenvironmental behavior according to behavioral 
insights. Rather, the general motives and methods of gov-
ernment should be publicly known. Thaler and Sunstein 
drew a distinction between hidden manipulations such 
as subliminal advertising and visible ones such as 
graphic warnings of drug side effects. They argued that 
only the latter are justifiable. This is a relatively weak 
form of the transparency criterion. A stricter form would 
be to require the targets of nudges to be explicitly and 
directly informed as to what nudge is being imple-
mented and why. Nudgers could even be required to 
explain the psychological mechanisms involved. It 
seems reasonable to expect policymakers to adhere to 
stronger forms of transparency where it is easy to do 
so. For example, ballot bins, which nudge smokers to 
avoid littering by asking them to vote on some popular 
culture controversy with their cigarette butts, can easily 
feature explanations of how they work.
Welfare
Another central plank in the justification of BPPs is that 
they offer a novel set of tools for improving people’s 
welfare however they might define it. Sunstein (2014) 
argued that in the face of a plurality of perspectives on 
what constitutes a good life, libertarian paternalism 
enhances welfare by respecting individuals’ own judg-
ments about “how to make their own lives go well” 
(p.  104). This idea that well-being is whatever they 
prefer (“desire fulfillment”) is the dominant account of 
well-being in welfare economics and political theory 
(Adler, 2019). BPP introduces an important nuance to 
the preference-satisfaction approach to policymaking 
by revealing the inconsistency of preferences with and 
without cognitive bias. It argues that welfare consists 
in the coolly deliberated, “rational” preferences of indi-
viduals. BPP is justified where it can promote this wel-
fare by removing cognitive biases that distort 
decision-making in the heat of the moment (Lourenço 
et  al., 2016, pp. 9–10). Behavioral interventions are 
justified because people behave in a “self-destructive” 
manner in their absence (Loewenstein & Haisley, 2008, 
p. 211).
Modesty
A final feature of behavioral policy in practice is that 
they are typically, although not always, humble in their 
ambitions. They pursue small targets such as incremen-
tal improvements in tax compliance rather than radical 
policy reforms. The diffusion of the EAST framework 
across government communications and service deliv-
ery is a clear example of this. Few, if any, meaningful 
policy changes are made; rather, the cosmetics of policy 
delivery are altered to account for cognitive biases and 
thereby enhance citizen engagement. This modest qual-
ity of behavioral interventions has been seen by some 
people as a shortcoming (for a discussion, see Chetty, 
2015), but it ensures that nudges tend to stay away from 
especially controversial applications at the boundaries 
of libertarian paternalism. Curiously, the COVID-19 pan-
demic has arguably seen these modest aspirations aban-
doned amid “life and death” rhetoric. Contested evidence 
about “behavioral fatigue” was seen to play a crucial 
role in the development of public-health strategy and 
the justification of liberty-restricting regulation. The 
value and modesty of BPP has consequently attracted 
increased public scrutiny (Sibony, 2020).
The Ethical Boundaries of Behavioral 
Interventions
We turn now to extant critiques of behavioral policy. 
Our objective here is twofold. First, we aim to demon-
strate that even though it is grounded in the arguably 
sophisticated normative framework of libertarian pater-
nalism, BPP remains controversial. Second, we aim to 
illuminate the boundaries of libertarian paternalism and 
the problematic consequences associated with crossing 
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them. Our intention is not to make an ethical judgment 
about libertarian paternalism. We try to remain neutral 
regarding the ethicalness of nudges. Our perspective is 
that libertarian paternalism has been used successfully 
to justify the widespread adoption of BPP by govern-
ments. This is an empirical observation, not an ethical 
claim. We suspect that WPP will not be widely adopted 
by policymakers unless it can be similarly justified. 
Unfortunately, we argue that libertarian paternalism is 
a poor fit for WPP. The boost framework fits WPP more 
easily, and governments (e.g., Germany) that are rela-
tively suspicious of libertarian paternalism seem ame-
nable to boosting. It therefore seems sensible for 
advocates of WPP to become familiar with boosting and 
adapt their proposals to fit it. That said, as with libertar-
ian paternalism, we remain neutral regarding the overall 
ethicalness of boosting.
Critiques from rationality
We begin with critiques emerging from the way behav-
ioral economics understands rationality and uses it as 
a normative standard. First, Rizzo and Whitman (2019) 
argued that nudges rob largely rational individuals of 
opportunities to autonomously learn about their behav-
ioral biases and institute their own correctives. For 
example, people on a diet will consciously avoid the 
confectionary aisle when shopping, empty the house 
of ice cream, and store cookies out of sight on the top 
shelf. Choice architecture designed using behavioral 
insights impedes individuals from becoming more ratio-
nal over time ( Jones et al., 2013). Dworkin (2019) noted 
how the targeting of policies at cognitive failure and 
irrationality can end up reinforcing faulty heuristics given 
that carefully designed choice architectures allow bad 
reasoning to lead to good outcomes. Nudges can thus 
be opposed to the democratic ideal of acting in accor-
dance with and in conscious recognition of reasons.
Second, White (2017) raised the concern that if cog-
nitive biases, dysfunctions, and limitations are as per-
vasive as behavioral economists argue, then revealed 
preferences constitute a questionable foundation for 
welfare analysis. The legitimacy of nudges hinges on 
the ability to identify underlying “rational” preferences 
that would be revealed in choices if only biases were 
removed. The abundance of biases identified to date 
suggests that the identification of these “true” prefer-
ences might be impossible, if they exist at all.
Both critiques point to a third, metaissue: the need 
for some theory of subject formation to ground the 
nudge paradigm ( Jones et  al., 2013; Pykett, 2012; 
Rebonato, 2012). What we mean by a theory of subject 
formation here is an account of where preferences come 
from. This is a long-standing black box in economics 
created by the neoclassical assumption of exogenous 
preferences. Preferences are of course endogenous. 
They are shaped by the agent’s social context (Bowles, 
1998; Hoff & Stiglitz, 2016) and constructed and devel-
oped by the agent over time in response to new infor-
mation. The psychological sciences similarly host a 
myriad of divergent perspectives on subject formation, 
from theories of evolutionary neurobiology to psycho-
social accounts. These contextual and cognitive issues 
can easily be political. For example, social scientists 
have emphasized that revealed preferences might 
emerge from a context that is problematic, such as 
conformism to oppressive regimes. Why should such 
preferences be taken as an appropriate standard of 
welfare? BPP needs an account, potentially on a nudge-
by-nudge basis, of the introspective process by which 
true preferences come about and can be identified by 
policymakers (Dworkin, 2019; Sunstein, 2017; Wilkinson, 
2013).
Critiques from technocracy
We turn now to a collection of critiques that can be 
grouped under the heading of technocracy. Liberal 
political theory has always been concerned about the 
question of who rules the rulers. This is obviously a 
concern in behavioral interventions in which policy-
makers largely assume citizens’ true preferences. What 
is to stop policymakers passing off their own prefer-
ences as those of citizens? In a recent account of the 
behavioral insights movement in the Dutch government, 
Feitsma (2018) considered whether the proliferation of 
behavioral insights teams, behavioral experts, and 
choice architects in government can be criticized on 
the basis of a renewed technocracy and psychocracy. 
Here, bureaucrats and decision-makers are guided by 
psychological expertise rather than public dialogue. 
Such concerns are taken seriously by people promoting 
nudge policies. Sunstein (2014) asked, “Who will moni-
tor the choice architects, or create a choice architecture 
for them?” (p. 16). Likewise, the UK’s Behavioural 
Insight Team published the behavioral government 
report (Hallsworth et al., 2018) to demonstrate how to 
work around the fact that “elected and unelected gov-
ernment officials are themselves influenced by the same 
heuristics and biases that they try to address in others” 
(p. 7).
A second line of critique attacks the way the evidence-
based policy paradigm presents properly normative and 
political questions as technical and therefore to be 
resolved by experts rather than the public (Sanderson, 
2003; Sullivan, 2011). Far from being nonideological, 
the way the rationales of policy effectiveness, cost effi-
ciency, and “what works” are operationalized constitutes 
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a normative agenda (Triantafillou, 2013). By reducing 
the welfare argument to a technical debate about the 
existence of systematic, empirically evidenced cognitive 
biases that universally plague decision-making, the 
need for normative justifications at all is brushed away 
(Rebonato, 2012, p. 394).
Third, critics have questioned the degree to which 
BPP focuses responsibility for public welfare on indi-
viduals. Many interventions target and potentially 
demonize certain behaviors that may not be caused so 
much by cognitive biases as by objective social condi-
tions and life circumstances such as poverty. In some 
cases of poor welfare outcomes, causation might ulti-
mately lie in poor policy settings, such as urban plan-
ning that leads to sprawl, limited public transport, and 
food deserts. In this case, policy effectiveness should 
not be evaluated on the basis of behavioral change in 
narrow experimental conditions. Instead, evaluation 
should consider whether policy contributes to the real-
ization of just conditions (Prainsack & Buyx, 2014) and 
the rectification of the deep causes of the social prob-
lems to be tackled (Quigley & Farrell, 2019).
Critiques from deliberation
Riley (2017) raised a concern about the epistemic jus-
tice of nudges that pulls in themes from each of the 
above lines of critique. Epistemic injustice affects a 
citizen in his or her capacity as a knower. Nudges argu-
ably involve epistemic injustice because they work 
through the stimulation of “non-deliberative cognition” 
(Riley, 2017, p. 600). The citizen’s ability to exercise his 
or her reasoning and judgment are bypassed in nudges 
on the grounds that these faculties are plagued with 
bias. Riley was concerned that the cumulative project 
of nudging across the gamut of public policy could 
restrict people’s willingness and ability to reasonably 
deliberate “amongst other recognised epistemic and 
cultural peers” (Riley, 2017, p. 604). This would limit 
situations in which they can be involved in setting 
agendas and deliberatively arriving at the public goals 
of public policy. The proliferation of nudges could pull 
an increasing number of policy domains away from 
citizens and their capacity to act in the future, giving 
responsibility instead to technocrats.
Critiques of causal inference
A final cluster of critiques concerns the evidence and 
theory that underpins behavioral science and nudges. 
Studies continue to emerge in which the existence and/
or severity of many of the behavioral biases invoked in 
BPP are questioned (Gal & Rucker, 2018; Yechiam, 
2019). Other studies have failed to replicate the effects 
of specific behavioral interventions ( Jachimowicz et al., 
2019; Shadel et  al., 2019). Indeed, in a recent meta-
analysis of a large range of nudges, Hummel and 
Maedche (2019) found that only 62% were statistically 
significant. These results undermine claims to effective-
ness in BPP.
More broadly, Grüne-Yanoff (2017) argued, some-
what controversially, that far from providing explana-
tions of decision-making, “behavioral economists 
typically engage in developing as-if models: namely, 
models that fit the behavioural phenomena, but [make] 
no (legitimate) claim to the underlying psychological 
mechanisms that brought about this behaviour” (p. 67; 
see also Berg & Gigerenzer, 2010). In the place of 
explanation, behavioral science offers instead correc-
tives and qualifications to existing models and new 
constructs that correlate with experimental evidence. 
In so doing, psychological perspectives have been mis-
represented as the science of irrational decision-making 
(Gigerenzer, 2018). Grüne-Yanoff (2016, p. 480) further 
argued that behavioral economics cannot offer robust 
and effective evidence to justify nudge policies that will 
work in the long term or in general equilibrium, and 
so governments should not rush to implement BPP on 
the basis of current knowledge. Along with the failures 
to replicate outlined above, these critiques call into 
question claims from nudge advocates about how set-
tled behavioral science is.
This critique of the mechanistic ambiguity of nudges 
is related to a more general critique of RCTs concerning 
their external validity (Deaton & Cartwright, 2018). 
Although RCTs can provide tight causal identification 
(internal validity), their findings are typically hard to 
generalize to other circumstances (external validity). 
Behavioral interventions may be more robust to this 
charge than other areas of policy because they claim 
knowledge of near-universal characteristics of human 
decision-making. Regardless, there may be a need to 
combine RCTs with other methods of evaluation to 
understand the effects and effectiveness of behavioral 
policies in a rich, contextual way.
From Behavioral Insights to Well-Being
These four lines of critique suggest that psychological 
interventions can be controversial even if they conform 
to the normative requirements of effectiveness, auton-
omy, transparency, and welfare proposed by libertarian 
paternalism. There is currently a lack of evidence to 
empirically assess the severity of these issues across 
behavioral policymaking. Some research exists on the 
public acceptability of hypothetical nudges in different 
international contexts that underlines the importance 
of trust in public institutions (Sunstein et  al., 2019). 
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However, there is a dearth of research on the long-term 
and cumulative effects of behavioral public policies and 
few accounts of the lived experiences of being involved 
in behavioral interventions (for an exception, see Cohn 
& Lynch, 2017). Nudging, then, is arguably popular but 
at least somewhat controversial, and caution is required 
if behavioral interventions are to be spread more widely 
and scaled up.
We turn now to applying the insights gained from 
our analysis of the foundations and limits of libertarian 
paternalism to nascent WPP. We take WPP to include 
two items. The first is “happiness interventions,” which 
are aimed at improving the mental states, notably emo-
tional health, of specific populations, such as in schools, 
workplaces, or place-based communities. Mental states 
include feelings of meaning, purpose, accomplishment, 
engagement, and other states sometimes associated 
with psychological well-being, not just happiness. The 
second is government well-being budgeting, which pri-
oritizes policy spending to improve the aggregate life 
satisfaction of the population (Frijters et al., 2020). We 
distinguish such WPP from the promotion of “econo-
mies of well-being,” such as in New Zealand, Iceland, 
Scotland, or Wales. The latter is a broader and more 
explicitly political agenda that uses social indicators 
and composite quality-of-life metrics to orient public 
policy away from economic growth and toward creating 
the objective conditions for inclusive, fairly distributed, 
and sustainable prosperity. We argue that happiness inter-
ventions and well-being budgeting transgress the prin-
ciples of effectiveness and autonomy and that their 
adherence to the principle of welfare is questionable. 
Initial indicators of transparency are more encouraging.
Effectiveness
Advocacy for BPP was founded on experimental studies 
of both psychological mechanisms such as present bias 
and specific policy interventions based on those mecha-
nisms, such as default schemes. Experimental evaluation 
in WPP is increasingly strong on psychological mecha-
nisms but remains weak on policy applications (Clark 
et  al., 2018). To mimic the success sequence of BPP, 
WPP will also need to demonstrate cost-effectiveness. 
Lordan and McGuire’s (2018) evaluation of the UK’s 
Healthy Minds curriculum, aimed at improving psycho-
logical resilience and improving health and behavior, 
provides a template for how to do this.
Some people have proposed WPPs are particularly 
weak on the “what works” front. Well-being budgeting, 
for example, is heavily reliant on correlation analysis that 
produces inconclusive results. It might be feasible at a 
micro level in which two policies suited to a niche area 
can be compared robustly on the basis of experimental 
evidence. For example, if a government decided to 
introduce mood-management training in schools to pro-
mote subjective well-being (SWB), it could compare 
the cost-effectiveness of the Healthy Minds and 
ENHANCE programs (Heintzelman et al., 2020). How-
ever, our current understanding of SWB at the macro 
level, at which experiments are challenging, is limited. 
For example, Clark et al.’s (2018) regression analysis of 
the “origins of happiness” has an R2 of .14 (i.e., the 
regression explains only 14% of the variation in life 
satisfaction). Their regression for childhood well-being 
has an R2 of only .03. Using such unclear results to 
decide spending priorities is not “modest” and invites 
unintended consequences and misplaced resources.
Oishi et al.’s (2018) argument for designing taxation 
policy according to life-satisfaction outcomes illustrates 
these risks. Using time-series regression modeling, they 
showed that periods of relatively high progressive taxa-
tion were associated with relatively large increases in 
the life satisfaction of the poor and only relatively small 
decreases in the satisfaction of the rich. Oishi et al. 
argued that taxation should therefore be more progres-
sive because this will increase total SWB. Leaving aside 
the contentious politics of inequality and taxation, Oishi 
et al.’s methods did not establish that progressive taxa-
tion caused the discrepancies in life satisfaction. Note 
that they did not assess whether it was higher social 
security spending during periods of high taxation that 
was the real causal element in the higher rates of sat-
isfaction among the poor. If it is social security that 
increases life satisfaction, then increasing taxes will 
have little direct effect. Meanwhile, the taxation could 
depress consumption and increase unemployment for 
poor people, reducing their life satisfaction. Establish-
ing causation in a manner suitable for policy work will 
likely require psychologists to become more familiar 
with the nonexperimental methods for establishing cau-
sation developed by other social sciences, notably eco-
nomics, as advocated recently by Grosz et al. (2020).
A final effectiveness issue for WPP is residual concerns 
around the measurement of psychological well-being, 
especially SWB. Many early criticisms around question 
order, effects of day of the week, social-desirability bias, 
and other peculiarities of subjective response (Bertrand 
& Mullainathan, 2001) have been largely addressed 
through improved survey design and question wording 
(National Research Council, 2013; OECD, 2013). How-
ever, concerns remain about the noncomprehensive-
ness of single-item SWB measures (e.g., life-satisfaction 
scales), how people interpret questions, and scale 
norming (Benjamin et al., 2020). Scale norming seems 
a particularly pernicious issue in a policy context 
because it biases statistics in a way that undermines 
cost-effectiveness analysis (Adler, 2013). In scale 
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norming, the qualitative meaning of the points on a 
respondent’s scale changes between waves of a survey 
(Fleurbaey & Blanchet, 2013). It is called response shift 
in the quality-of-life literature (Ubel et al., 2010). In a 
meta-analysis of response-shift studies, Schwarz et al. 
(2006) found consistent evidence for its existence, 
although effect sizes were small to moderate.
There are other measures of psychological well-
being besides SWB, notably those associated with so-
called eudaimonic perspectives on well-being (Marsh 
et al., 2020; Ryff, 1989). Although these rely on self-
reports as much as SWB metrics do, they aim at objective 
constructs such as basic psychological needs. However, 
these measures tend to be highly multidimensional, 
which makes them unsuitable for use in cost-benefit 
analysis (Fleurbaey & Blanchet, 2013). Furthermore, 
scholars in the subjective well-being tradition have 
argued that these measures, if valid, have not been 
applied extensively at sociological scale and are there-
fore too immature to be used in public policy at this 
stage (National Research Council, 2013).
Welfare
The way psychologists define well-being can be prob-
lematic in a policy context. It is important to understand 
that well-being simpliciter is not an ateological concept. 
It must be defined before it can be measured and is 
quite nebulous (Alexandrova, 2017). This definitional 
process is often obscured in disciplinary research silos 
that each have their own midlevel theory of well-being. 
Well-being is a value-laden concept, meaning that its 
definition involves making a value judgment, and so 
what definition is ultimately settled on has normative 
implications (Prinzing, 2020; Tiberius & Hall, 2010). For 
example, if well-being is defined as “happy” mental 
states, then government cost-benefit analyses will seek 
to make citizens happier even if happiness is not citi-
zens’ preference. This can lead to (soft) authoritarian-
ism, something political ethicists spend much time 
theorizing about but is rarely salient in psychological 
research. It is because of this value-laden nature that 
philosophers treat well-being as synonymous with the 
prudential good (Bishop, 2015), that is, what is “good 
for” individuals. This makes the normative associations 
of the concept apparent. Psychologists must be sensi-
tive to how the normative implications of how well-
being is defined shift in the transition from laboratory 
to policymaking.
Much WPP advocated by psychologists employs a 
mental state account of well-being. For example, Diener 
et al. (2009) advocated for policies to improve SWB, 
which they defined as “good mental states,” including 
satisfaction with life and a preponderance of positive 
affect over negative affect. SWB might be a suitable 
definition of well-being in the context of psychological 
science, but such mental-state definitions have long 
been anathema to philosophers and widely considered 
inappropriate for policy. We review the preeminent 
critiques below.
The first concern with defining well-being as a men-
tal state in a policy context is the already mentioned 
potential for ignoring citizen preferences. For example, 
Clark et al. (2018) argued, in the context of migration 
policy, that “the key to happiness is that the circle of 
sympathy is extended as widely as possible” (p. 122). 
Governments could use such logic to justify increasing 
migration because it makes everyone happier even if 
citizens express a preference for lower immigration. 
Benjamin et al. (2012) demonstrated that happiness and 
preference do not always coincide. They presented sur-
vey respondents with several paired choices. They 
asked first, “Which one would make you happier?” and 
then “Which one would you choose?” They found that 
although happiness and choice coincided on average 
in 83% of cases, on some questions, coincidence was 
below 50%. Western political philosophy has long been 
concerned about the coercive power of the state and 
averse to normative paradigms that allow the contraven-
tion of citizens’ wishes. Well-being is consequently 
often defined as preference satisfaction in the policy 
domain (Adler, 2019). WPP advocates should be cau-
tious about suggesting that policy should override 
“dumb” or “bad” preferences that undermine citizens’ 
SWB. This might be reasonable in a therapeutic context, 
but it is a redline in policy.
The second concern with mental-state definitions of 
welfare is what economists have called adaptive prefer-
ences (Sen, 1999). It is well established that people’s 
life satisfaction can acclimatize to their circumstances. 
Graham (2011) coined the “happy peasant” and “frus-
trated achiever” concepts to describe the phenomenon 
of impoverished individuals who report high levels of 
life satisfaction and objectively well-off individuals who 
nonetheless report relatively low levels of satisfaction. 
Life satisfaction has also been found to recover, often 
completely, to a set-point level over time following 
many shocks, including marriage, divorce, income 
growth, and even spinal injury (Sheldon & Lucas, 2014). 
Adaptation has two arguably perverse consequence for 
WPP. First, it means that government will focus policy 
resources (effort, attention, money) on frustrated achiev-
ers rather than happy peasants even though the peas-
ants are objectively worse off. From the point of view 
of distributional justice, this seems wrongheaded. Sec-
ond, if promoting adaptation is cheap, cost-effectiveness 
will often demand that governments help citizens adapt 
to adverse conditions rather than ameliorating those 
8 Fabian, Pykett
conditions. For example, it may be cheaper to be provide 
therapy to someone depressed about their spinal injury 
than to fix the spine. In such circumstances, adaptation 
seems to let government off from its responsibilities.
The third problem with mental-state policy is its 
anesthetizing effect on political sentiment. Critical theo-
rists have stressed that bad moods and dissatisfaction 
are important catalysts for justifiable political activism 
(Davies, 2015). When governments focus on improving 
such negative mental states by treating the feelings 
rather than their causes, they dissipate the political 
energy required to drive deep reforms. For example, 
policy targeting the mental health of homeless people 
might inadvertently undermine feelings of despair, 
anger, frustration, outrage, and agency that would oth-
erwise lead to an autonomous and effective campaign 
for affordable housing. Acknowledging this, “Housing 
First” homelessness reduction programs, which do not 
make housing conditional on substance abstinence, are 
more successful in preventing long-term homelessness 
and ill health (Baxter et al., 2019).
Mental-state policy is particularly perverse when it 
results in victim blaming. Friedli and Stearn (2015) gave 
the example of the U.K. government making welfare 
payments conditional on attending positive psychology 
sessions. This shifts responsibility for unemployment 
from the government’s procyclical austerity policies to 
citizens’ lack of a “positive attitude.” WPP needs to be 
mindful that it does not further burden already disem-
powered people with the need to feel happy and enthu-
siastic despite their situation.
Concerns around adaptation and political disempow-
erment are one reason why many areas of policy, such 
as the millennium development goals, are dominated 
by the capabilities definition of well-being. Capabilities 
are the options available to citizens in terms of who 
they can be and what they can do (Nussbaum, 2000). 
For example, a homosexual person in a country with 
same-sex marriage rights has more capabilities than an 
identical individual in a country without such rights 
and therefore has higher well-being. The focus of policy 
in the capabilities framework is on increasing the 
opportunities available to citizens through education, 
health, income growth, political enfranchisement, and 
capacity building. Citizens choose how to leverage 
these opportunities to satisfy their preferences. The 
capabilities approach ensures governments improve 
objective circumstances rather than how people feel 
about those circumstances. The boosts framework that 
we outline below resembles capabilities in that it pro-
motes citizens’ psychological capacities. This allows for 
mental states to be promoted indirectly—the policy 
objective is greater capability, but a by-product could 
be higher SWB.
Our discussion of welfare reveals two further points. 
First, well-being can be defined in a multitude of dif-
ferent and often incompatible ways. Subjective well-
being or happiness in the sense of self-assessed affect 
and life satisfaction is but one (mental state) account. 
We are concerned about the tendency in WPP advocacy 
to define well-being as a mental state and to then argue, 
implicitly or explicitly, that competing approaches are 
not about well-being. Income and prices, for example, 
may be a poor measure of SWB, but they are an effec-
tive measure of preference satisfaction (Angner, 2009). 
Second, what well-being is and how a government 
should go about promoting it are two separate ques-
tions. Even if there were broad consensus that SWB is 
simply “well-being,” it might nonetheless be inappropri-
ate for government to promote it in certain ways 
because of paternalism, adaptive preferences, and other 
issues discussed above.
Autonomy
Some advocates of WPP have argued that SWB is more 
respectful of autonomy than existing preference-satis-
faction and capabilities approaches. For example, Clark 
et al. (2018) wrote that life satisfaction “is democratic—
it allows individuals to assess their lives on the basis 
of whatever they consider important to themselves” 
(p. 4). Likewise, Frijters et al. (2020) wrote that a life-
satisfaction scale “takes individuals seriously as political 
agents and sets them at the top of the judgment tree” 
(p. 16).
This claim is questionable. Respondents to SWB sur-
vey questions are never asked why they hold a level of 
life satisfaction. Instead, their numerical responses are 
placed on the left side of a regression and variables 
chosen by the researchers are used to determine what 
causes respondents’ levels of satisfaction. This is a sen-
sible research practice. Asking respondents what deter-
mines their satisfaction directly could contaminate 
responses with present, social-desirability, and other 
biases (National Research Council, 2013). Unfortunately, 
this practice is problematic in a policy context in which 
identifying and explaining subjective biases is central 
to the process of policy deliberation. The practice uses 
cognitive failings to justify bypassing the voice of citi-
zens, cutting them out of deliberation, and giving pre-
eminence to experts in decision-making. This was 
precisely the critique leveled at nudging, so WPP seems 
to have little advantage here. Stutzer (2019) pointed out 
that people derive life satisfaction from liberal-democratic 
processes themselves independently from the outcome 
of those processes. Thus, any well-being proposals 
derived from expert analysis of life-satisfaction data 
should be taken to the public for deliberating and 
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vetting before being implemented as policy. This two-
step approach would avoid contaminating life-satisfac-
tion responses while preserving citizen autonomy.
Transparency
Transparency is a major issue for nudges because of 
their potential to be subliminal in practice. For example, 
Hansen and Jespersen (2013) noted that many nudges, 
such as offering only smaller plates in cafeterias to 
reduce food waste, do not engage reflective thinking. 
Nudging for happiness would have similar issues, but 
much WPP is not remotely subliminal. Furthermore, 
early indications from jurisdictions in which WPP is 
prominent, such as Bhutan, suggest that government 
tends to be explicit when its policy objective is well-
being. Indeed, governments tend to shift to WPP amid 
much fanfare, as in New Zealand’s well-being budget. 
One issue for transparency that may arise as circum-
stances develop is whether a government is explicit 
about the kind of well-being it is promoting. For exam-
ple, well-being in the capabilities framework is mark-
edly different from well-being in terms of mental states.
Boosts: A Way Forward for WPP
WPP would be hard to justify under libertarian pater-
nalism at this time because of its limited effectiveness 
credentials and tendency to transgress the principles of 
welfare and autonomy. Although these may not be rel-
evant in research and therapeutic contexts, they become 
critical in the policy domain in which state power and 
democratic legitimacy are salient considerations. An 
alternate framework that could be helpful to guide WPP 
to legitimate applications is the boosts paradigm (Hertwig 
& Grüne-Yanoff, 2017). In contrast to nudging’s empha-
sis on technocratically guided choices, boosts focus on 
improving citizens’ capacity for self-guidance. Broad 
categories of boosts include skills training, explicit per-
suasion and information representation, and assistance 
for subjects to inculcate habits or routines based on 
psychological science that promote welfare through, 
for example, financial literacy, risk assessment, health-
promoting choices, informed decisions, and “effective 
self-regulation” (Hertwig & Grüne-Yanoff, 2017, p. 982).
Boosting builds on Gigerenzer’s critiques of behav-
ioral economics and promotes an alternative account of 
psychology: ecological rationality (Gigerenzer, 2018; 
Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009), in which people’s non-
rationality is taken as an adaptive capacity to be valued 
under conditions of uncertainty rather than a cognitive 
error to be corrected (Hertwig et al., 2019). Relatedly, 
whereas behaviorism views the mind as profoundly irra-
tional, with biases as the rule rather than the exception, 
boosting draws on a different body of literature in psy-
chology that emphasizes the immense human capacity 
to learn and develop competence. Gigerenzer (2018) 
argued that instead of paternalistic interventions such 
as nudging to correct biases, public policies should aim 
“to hone the skills of the general public in dealing with 
risks and making decisions” (p. 311).
Gigerenzer (2018) considered the German chancel-
lery’s citizen-centered approach to behavioral insights 
and policy testing exemplary in this regard. Yet the 
policy application of boosts in Germany is somewhat 
underdeveloped. Since 2015, the federal government 
there has favored information framing and educational 
campaigns. Examples include hospital hygiene, vaccina-
tion, and consumer protection (German Federal 
Government, 2020). These initiatives are based on nar-
row forms of customer insight or citizen consultation. 
There is therefore scope for elaborating the psychologi-
cal and normative basis of boosting and identifying 
potential applications in WPP.
Boosts differ from nudges in several respects. First, 
they are educative and sustainable over the long term. 
We call this the principle of capacity. Boosts enhance 
citizens’ understanding of psychological processes in 
ways that they can leverage to benefit their welfare. 
Boosts therefore expand people’s capabilities—the 
things they can be and can do. This means that boosts 
avoid issues of adaptive preferences and keep govern-
ment focused on objective circumstances, not feelings. 
In this vein, the Netherlands government now subjects 
public policies to a capacity to act test that requires 
legislators to consider whether policies are based on 
“realistic assumptions about people’s mental resilience” 
(Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy, 
2019). Like nudging, this recognizes limits to rationality 
but is more boosting in nature because it promotes 
action to increase mental capacity and self-determination 
in the long term.
Second, boosts avoid assuming a deficit model of 
cognition and behavior. They do not conceptualize psy-
chological phenomena such as cognitive biases as fail-
ings but instead see them as adaptations whose utility 
varies across contexts. Boosts focus on helping recipi-
ents better understand how their psychology manifests 
in different spaces. We call this the principle of empow-
erment. It mitigates the potential for victim blaming in 
psychologically informed policy, deflects accusations 
of dumb or bad preferences, and resists efforts by the 
powerful at subordinating the weak on the grounds of 
their deficient psychology.
Ideally, boosts should be empowering in the context 
of their implementation, transferable between contexts, 
and durable over the longer term. There is a significant 
difference between, say, promoting decision-making 
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capacity as a learned mental skill and empowering 
people to improve their well-being by autonomously 
transforming aspects of their social context. For exam-
ple, WPP for the homeless may be of marginal useful-
ness if it does not assimilate the powerlessness of their 
situation.
Finally, boosts require not only transparency but also 
active and conscious cooperation from persons being 
boosted (Hertwig & Grüne-Yanoff, 2017, p. 982). We 
call this the principle of participation. It protects against 
paternalism and manipulation and engages citizens in 
a way that fosters deliberation and democratic oversight 
of policy choices and outcomes. An important dimen-
sion of participation is that it connotes a collective 
activity, challenging the methodological individualism 
found in some strands of psychology.
We turn now to some examples of how these prin-
ciples might be navigated in WPP. We discussed earlier 
the problematic use of positive psychology as part of 
conditionality for receiving welfare payments. One 
could mistakenly see such programs as boosts because 
they train welfare recipients in psychological skills. 
This satisfies the capacity principle. However, such 
programs transgress the empowerment and participa-
tion principles. On empowerment, they assume that 
psychological deficits (i.e., a negative attitude and 
learned helplessness) lie behind welfare recipients’ 
inability to find employment. Recipients’ attitudes may 
instead be a normal response to overwhelming envi-
ronmental conditions of poverty, family breakdown, 
precarious work contracts, and limited social capital. 
On participation, because welfare recipients’ liveli-
hoods depend on attending these conditional pro-
grams, they act under duress, and their perspectives 
on the complex barriers to their employment are rarely 
given voice.
School-based emotional-management programs such 
as Healthy Minds offer an instructive contrast. Such 
programs develop psychology skills, satisfying the 
capacity principle. Education is a domain in which 
paternalism and consent are generally considered less 
problematic. If such programs are universal rather than 
targeted at underperforming or emotionally volatile 
students, they may satisfy the empowerment principle 
and pay due regard to social context. Instructors would 
have to be sensitive to how students whose early child-
hood experiences were detrimental to their learned 
capacity for emotional regulation may react to the cur-
riculum. However, if new skills are framed in terms of 
wisdom rather than treatment, they could have an 
empowering rather than demoralizing effect. Note that 
Hertwig and Grüne-Yanoff (2017, p. 982) differentiated 
between boosts and schooling. However, Healthy Minds 
satisfies their criteria for this distinction. In particular, 
it builds motivational and decisional competencies on 
the basis of psychological science. It is also quick and 
delivered “just in time” for the onset of late adolescence, 
a volatile period for well-being.
Finally, what we call social boosts have the potential 
to reconfigure WPP from an expert-led agenda domi-
nated by economists to a more interdisciplinary, par-
ticipatory, and context-sensitive approach to public 
policy design. Social boosts are investments in com-
munity infrastructure, both built and social, such as 
meeting places, neighborhood design, and green and 
blue spaces and clubs. Recent examples include the 
Men in Sheds program to tackle social isolation, com-
munity-gardening initiatives, and active travel interven-
tions. Social boosts are inherently participatory and 
focused on enhancing community capacity.
In an evidence review, Bagnall et al. (2018) found 
that public interventions aimed at reshaping social rela-
tionships through physical environments can improve 
both individual and community health and well-being, 
social relations, social trust, and social capital. Such 
outcome measures draw on methodological and epis-
temological perspectives from community psychology. 
They emphasize that people are embedded in groups 
and that individual well-being is therefore inextricably 
tied to group well-being. This approach diverges from 
the individualistic paradigm associated with SWB. It 
defines community well-being as “the combination of 
social, economic, environmental, cultural, and political 
conditions identified by individuals and their communi-
ties as essential for them to flourish and fulfil their 
potential” (Wiseman & Brasher, 2008, p. 358). Examples 
include asset-based community development in health 
care promotion and schemes to enhance collective 
physical, voluntary, or civic activity. These were found 
to enhance people’s skills and confidence to act inde-
pendently in the future, meeting the empowerment 
principle (Bagnall et al., 2018).
Conclusion
In this article, we drew lessons from the history of 
behavioral policy for the nascent push to inject psycho-
logical insights concerning well-being into public policy. 
We reviewed the four normative principles underpin-
ning the relatively successful reception of behavioral 
science among policymakers and citizens: effectiveness, 
autonomy, transparency, and welfare. We then explained 
some of the major critiques of these principles of lib-
ertarian paternalism. These critiques demonstrate the 
normative complexity of transferring psychological 
insights from the laboratory to policymaking. Many of 
these critiques apply just as readily to proposed well-
being public policies as they do to behavioral policy. 
We argued that WPP that targets mental states is espe-
cially prone to transgressing the normative principles 
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of libertarian paternalism. We offered the boosts para-
digm as an alternate framework for considering the 
normative legitimacy of well-being public policies. We 
distinguished three normative principles that character-
ize boosts: capacity, empowerment, and participation. 
Adherence to these principles allows well-being boosts 
to be justified within the capabilities definition of well-
being, which is one of the more widespread concep-
tualizations of the term in the policy space. These 
arguments are summarized in Table 1, which presents 
the pros and cons of libertarian paternalism and boosts 
for BPP and WPP, respectively.
In the final part of the article, we discussed some 
examples of WPP boosts, including psychological skills 
training in the context of unemployment policies and 
school curricula and social boosts for community well-
being. We illustrated policy contexts in which these 
boosts could be useful and legitimate and might be 
Table 1. Pros and Cons of Normative Paradigms for Applying Psychological Science in Public Policy
Normative paradigm
BPP WPP
Pros Cons Pros Cons
Libertarian paternalism
Effectiveness: Relatively 




Autonomy: All choices 




at least be open 
about the intention 
and mechanism of 
the psychological 
intervention
Welfare: The realization 
of the recipient’s 
own preferences is 
the policy objective
Promoted the uptake of 
BPPs by policymakers 
by providing them 
with a sophisticated 
and relatively firm 
normative foundation
Straightforward set of 
criteria
Restrictive, which is 
appropriate given 
the potential for 
manipulation, 
but open enough 








such as the welfare 









Does not respect 
recipients’ 
reasons for their 
behavior
Limited recognition 
























Welfare principle is 
almost impossible 
to respect when 
the objective is 




Hard to fit many WPPs 
into libertarian 
paternalism because 
WPPs are often not 
behavioral in nature 
and do not involve 
correcting cognitive 
biases
Scientific evidence is 
not strong enough 
to meet effectiveness 
criteria for most 
WPPs at this time
Boosting
Capacity: Educative 











Avoids many cons for 





involve citizens in 
policymaking














Allows for many 
WPPs that 
would be ruled 



























normatively suspect according to the three principles. 
We hope that our analysis is helpful to individuals and 
organizations interested in pursuing policy applications 
based on behavioral insights and psychological per-
spectives on well-being.
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